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RE-ENVISIONING LABOR LAW: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR FINKIN
KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE*
It has become commonplace for labor law writers to speak
about the crisis in labor law. In the past two years, almost every
prominent labor law scholar and labor movement activist has ex-
pressed serious disillusionment with the National Labor Relations
Act' and discussed the desirability of its repeal. The fiftieth anniver-
sary of the National Labor Relations Act in 1985 provided a tailor-
made occasion for such soul-searching.2
In all these discussions, there are several subtextual questions,
rarely addressed head-on, which are central to one's views on the
future of the Act. That is, in order to evaluate the Act, one must
have a position on questions such as: Is the Act, as it has been inter-
preted, beneficial or harmful to the cause of organized labor? Is the
problem with the Act the fact that it adopted an industrial pluralist
* Associate Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. B.A.,
Harvard University, 1970; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979. The author is grateful to
David Carlson, Peter Gabel, ArthurJacobson, Robin Kowal Kern,Joseph McCahery, and
David Van Zandt for their helpful suggestions, criticisms, and advice.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1982 & Supp. 1986). In the interest of clarity, I will here-
inafter refer to the original 1935 Act as the "Wagner Act," and to the 1947 Act, which
incorporated the Taft-Hartley amendments, as the "National Labor Relations Act," the
"N.L.R.A.," or simply "the Act."
2. For example, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland has advocated that the N.L.R.A.
be repealed because it no longer serves labor's cause. AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Law a
Dead Letter, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 2. Similarly, Jack Sweeney, President of
the Service Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, recently said in a speech delivered to a
Fordham Law School symposium on the subject, Is There A Need To Amend the National
Labor Relations Act?, "So my answer to the question whether the National Labor Rela-
tions Act should be amended is simple: No! The National Labor Relations Act ... is,
for all practical purposes, now dead." 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1142, 1143 (1984). See also
"Has Labor Law Failed, "Oversight Hearings, Part I, Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on Manpower &
Housing of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1984) (statement of
William Gould) ("American labor law has failed to implement basic policy objectives
enshrined in the N.L.R.A. itself."); Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations:
Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1018-
19 (1984) (because of widespread dissatisfaction with the labor laws, the time has come
to review the premises of our entire system of labor law); Summers, Past Premises, Present
Failures and Future Needs in Labor Leislation, 31 BurF. L. REV. 9, 18 (1982) ("The assump-
tions on which our labor law have [sic] been based for half a century have not been
realized and its purposes have not been fulfilled.").
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interpretation' or that it did not take that interpretation far enough?
For those who are critical of the industrial pluralist interpretation,
there are further questions to be asked: Was the industrial pluralist
interpretation the only possible way of construing the language and
history of the statute? Are there other ways of organizing collective
bargaining that would be more beneficial to labor? One's position
on these questions vitally affects the particular proposals for change
that one would make. Interestingly enough, despite the almost uni-
versal consensus that there is a crisis in labor law, there is no con-
sensus at all on what is wrong with the Act or how the current
deplorable situation, however defined, came about.
Professor Matthew Finkin has written a thought-provoking arti-
cle that raises several of these questions, albeit in a somewhat indi-
rect form. His piece, Revisionism in Labor Law,4 criticizes articles by
Professor Karl Klare5 and me 6 and implicitly invites debate on these
questions. Professor Klare has ably and extensively replied to Pro-
fessor Finkin's critique of his piece,7 and here I want to reply to the
critique of mine. I do so with the hope that by addressing some of
Professor Finkin's points, I can also clarify my position on some of
these questions. Thus, I hope this effort helps us all move forward
in our current efforts to reconceptualize and reconstruct a new vi-
sion of what collective bargaining is all about, and what role unions
can and should play in our political and economic system.8
3. In my article, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509
(1981), I argue that there was a dominant interpretative tradition of the N.L.R.A., which
I label "industrial pluralism." Id. at 1511. For an exposition of this tradition, see infra
pages 980-84.
4. Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984).
5. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Con-
sciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
6. Stone, supra note 3.
7. Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining Law: A
Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985); See also Finkin, Does Karl Klare Protest
Too Much?, 44 MD. L. REV. 1100 (1985); Klare, Lost Opportunity: Concluding Thoughts on the
Finkin Critique, 44 MD. L. REV. 1111 (1985).
8. There is a growing body of critical legal scholarship about labor law that ad-
dresses these questions. For example, in addition to the work of Professor Klare and
myself mentioned above, supra notes 5-7, see J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1983); Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas
andAt-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001 (1985); Minda, The Common Law
of Employment At-Will in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 939 (1985); Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L. J. 793 (1984);
Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 396 (1978).
There are also scholars outside the emerging critical legal scholarship tradition who
are developing innovative perspectives and proposals in response to the perceived crisis
in labor law. For example, Professor Paul Weiler has written an astute analysis of the
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Before contending with some of the particular points of disa-
greement between Professor Finkin and myself, I want to summarize
my argument. In my earlier piece, I attempt to provide a framework
for analyzing the failures of the existing labor law-failures which I
argue inhere not in the National Labor Relations Act, but rather in
its interpretive tradition. My central claim is that there was a domi-
nant vision, or paradigm, of collective bargaining in the post-war era
that was both created by and reflected in the major post-war schol-
arly writing and judicial decisions of the time, and that this para-
digm has had a detrimental effect on the development of union
strength. Stated briefly, the paradigm is based on the analogy of the
workplace to a representational democracy, in which labor and man-
agement are described as political parties in a legislature, jointly
shaping the rules by which all are governed. It is a description and a
prescription of the workplace as a microcosmic pluralist democracy.
Such a stark summary of the paradigm makes it sound innocu-
ous enough, if even a bit bland. However, my argument is that the
paradigm stands in the way of any effort to create true participatory
democracy in the workplace because this paradigm blinds us to the
exercise of private power in the workplace and to the need for sub-
stantive government intervention. It does this by presupposing that
management and labor are equal partners in production and then
erecting legal rules on the basis of that fallacy. As a result, this pre-
tense of equality which the paradigm fosters has prevented the Act
from fulfilling the aspirations of those who saw it as a substantive
intervention into the workplace, the goal of which was to equalize
bargaining power by strengthening labor in its dealings with
management.
One of the implications of my argument is that this fallacy has
had an adverse impact on unions in actual cases. In the name of the
paradigm, unions have been reaping the worst of both worlds. On
failures of union organizing efforts, and has presented a compelling proposal to improve
the process by which unions are organized and bargaining rights secured. See Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769 (1983). Similarly, Professors Summers and Gould are writing about the labor
relations laws in other countries to suggest possible improvements in the laws here. See,
e.g., W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1984); Summers, Compari-
sons in Labor Law: Sweden and the United States, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1985). In a different
vein, James Medoff and Richard Freeman, in their book, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984),
present an empirical account of the positive contributions of labor unions to our society.
Additionally, Charles Sabel and Michael Piore have persuasively argued that there are
alternative models of industrial development that have implications for alternative ways
of organizing work. See C. SABEL & M. PIORE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POS-
SIBILrIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
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the one hand, courts are taking the obligation side of the paradigm
too literally and holding unions jointly responsible for management
decisions that violate the law.9 On the other hand, this joint respon-
sibility has not entailed joint authority. For example, the courts
have recently made it clear that unions are not entitled to have input
into managerial decisions about plant relocations, subcontracting,
or corporate transformations-decisions that have the most signifi-
cant impact on union members.' °
9. For example, several courts have found unions jointly liable with management
for violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), on
the grounds that by concluding a collective bargaining agreement, unions are jointly
responsible with management for all employment decisions. See, e.g., Howard v. Int'l
Molders & Allied Workers Union, 779 F.2d 1546 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2902
(1986) (holding union liable for discrimination which stemmed from employer's use of
non-validated test for promotions even though union urged employer to cease using
test); Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (court rejected as irrelevant union's argument that it should not be liable for
employer's discriminatory promotion and transfer scheme because the union had tried
unsuccessfully to eradicate such discrimination in collective bargaining); Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976)
(imposing liability on union for discriminatory promotion system even though union
had proposed nondiscriminatory promotion provisions during collective bargaining ses-
sions for three successive contracts, spanning a nine year period). But see Terrell v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 972 (1982) (whether union liable for unlawful employment practice depends upon
whether court convinced that the union has taken "every reasonable step" to eliminate
employer's discriminatory practices). See generally Stone, supra note 3, at 1575 nn. 348-
350 (citing cases where courts have held unions jointly liable with employers for discrim-
inatory employment practices over which unions had no control).
Courts have also found unions jointly liable with management in other types of
cases. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940,
956 (2d Cir. 1983) ("When a union becomes a party to a discriminatory provision in a
collective bargaining agreement binding the employer to an unlawful practice, the
union's conduct in aiding and abetting the employer to discriminate against employees
renders it independently liable for violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(3)."), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Brown v. Int'l Union, UAW, 512 F. Supp. 1337
(W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1982) (union breached duty of fair repre-
sentation by failing to discover that the employer defaulted in funding pension fund).
The recent Supreme Court decision, Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459
U.S. 212 (1983), takes this logic to its conclusion by holding a union liable for an em-
ployee's back pay, even though it was the employer who caused the wrongful dismissal
and who unilaterally controlled the prospects for reinstatement. Id. at 237 (White, J.,
dissenting). See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., First National Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
(management's decision to close part of its operation is not a subject of mandatory bar-
gaining); Weather Tamer, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 676 F.2d 483 (11 th Cir. 1982), (an economic
decision to close part of a plant and transfer operations to a new facility is not a subject
of mandatory bargaining); N.L.R.B. v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1182
(3rd Cir. 1982) (no duty to bargain over company decision to lease its accounts and
transfer work to another facility). See also Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co.,
268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (no duty to bargain over decision to consolidate operations);
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In my opinion, this double whammy has emerged from a chain
of seemingly logical applications of the paradigm. The recent
Supreme Court case of Bowen v. United States Postal Service " is an ex-
ample. In that case, a union was found liable for breaching its duty
of fair representation by not adequately pursuing the employee's
grievance, which alleged that he had been improperly suspended.
This type of case is known as a "hybrid Section 301/DFR" case be-
cause it involves allegations both that the union breached its duty
and that the employer breached the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The issue that went to the Supreme Court was the apportion-
ment of damages between the union and the employer. The district
court had instructed the jury that if it found both the union and the
employer liable, it could apportion damages between them in such a
way as to require the union to pay a portion of the employee's back
wages. 2 The union argued that its liability for breach of its duty
could render it responsible for the employee's litigation expenses to
vindicate his contract claim, and that the union could not be held
responsible for back pay because it was not the union's obligation to
pay wages in the first place.13
The Supreme Court held, on the basis of a pluralist analysis of
the unique nature of a collective bargaining agreement, 4 that a
union could be found liable for back wages of an employee who was
wrongfully dismissed by an employer. It reasoned that the indus-
trial pluralist scheme of industrial self-governance meant that un-
ions had the exclusive right and power to speak for employees, and
that therefore employees and the employer should be able to rely on
Otis Elevator Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 891 (1968) (no duty to bargain about unilateral man-
agement decision to relocate operation). In First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676,
the Court noted that the Act was never intended to make management and labor "equal
partners in running the business." Such language makes the descriptive plausibility of
the model, where management and labor are described as equal partners, increasingly
difficult to maintain.
11. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
12. 459 U.S. at 215.
13. 459 U.S. at 218-20; see also id. at 215 n.3 (counsel for the union stated, "Tradi-
tionally the Union does not pay wages.").
14. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reasoned from the premise that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement was more than "a simple contract of hire." Rather, it
"creat[es] relationships and interests under the federal common law of labor policy,"
459 U.S. at 220, and is a " 'generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.' " Id. at 224 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)). Furthermore, "fundamental to federal
labor policy is the grievance procedure." Bowen, 459 U.S. at 225. From this by-now-
commonplace statement of the industrial pluralist position, the Court reached its rather
startling holding.
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that right being exercised properly.' 5 When the union fails to exer-
cise that right responsibly, it should have to indemnify the employer
for the consequences.' 6
Justice White, in a strongly worded dissent, decried any analysis
of collective bargaining that shifted the burden of paying wages
from the employer to the union. He said that it was the employer
who caused the employee to be wrongfully dismissed in the first
place and who unilaterally controlled prospects for reinstatement.'
7
He stated that "neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the
union's duty of fair representation provides any support for the
Court's conclusion that the union has somehow committed itself to
protect the employer, and that the employer has the right to rely on
the union to cut off its liability."'" Likewise, the Bowen decision has
evoked strong criticism in the labor movement and the scholarly
community for being one more instance in which the courts are sad-
dling unions with crushing liabilities."
Although my article appeared before the Bowen decision, I be-
lieve my analysis helps us understand how the labor laws have come
15. 459 U.S. at 225-26.
16. 459 U.S. at 229. The Bowen court did not announce any particular formula for
apportioning damages between unions and employers in hybrid suits-that issue was
not before it on appeal. The narrow issue before the Court was whether the union could
be liable for back pay at all. The Court thus left open the question of what particular
apportionment of back pay liability is appropriate in such cases. See generally Vander-
Velde, Making Good on Vaca's Promise: Apportioning Back Pay to Achieve Remedial Goals, 32
UCLA L. REV. 302 (1984) (proposing apportionment rule and discussing several other
possible ones, including that permitted by the Supreme Court in Bowen).
17. 459 U.S. at 230-31, 239 (White, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 240. Justice White further stated that "there is no reason why the matter
should not be governed by the traditional rule of contract law," id. at 238, in effect
suggesting that the pluralist paradigm be abandoned in the analysis of damages for
breach of the duty of fair representation.
19. See, e.g., 1984 BNA LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 175 (1984) (union attorney Sa-
rah Siskind said of the Bowen decision that "serious unions, seeking to vindicate the
collective bargaining rights of their employees, have been loaded with staggering costs
and burdens that should not be theirs."); 1983 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 127-28
(1983) (union attorney Hugh Beins called the Bowen decision an " 'absolute bomb-
shell' " which will make it " 'inevitable' that unions will now press all grievances to arbi-
tration 'until the union goes bankrupt.' "); Francis, The New Apportionment Rule Under
Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 35 LAB. L.J. 71, 74, 87, (1984) (Bowen increases adver-
sarialness between management and labor, exaggerates union's responsibilities in col-
lective bargaining, aggravates tensions between individuals and their unions, and will
erode trust between union leaders and the rank-and-file.); Murray, Apportionment of Dam-
ages in Section 301 Duty of Fair Representation Actions: The Impact of Bowen v. United States
Postal Service, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 743, 771 (1983) (the majority in Bowen imposes a duty
on unions to indemnify the employer for its breach of contract); Comment, Adding Injury
to Insult: Bowen and the Duty of Fair Representation, 67 MARQUETrE L. REV. 317, 339 (1984)
(Bowen majority inappropriately imposed on the union a duty to the employer).
1986] 983
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to this sorry state. For by identifying the deep structure, or para-
digm, that characterizes the post-war developments of labor law, we
can make sense of such developments. Moreover, by showing how
the paradigm came to be embedded in post-war labor law doctrine
by a series of key Supreme Court decisions and developments at the
National Labor Relations Board, I implicitly (and sometimes explic-
itly) suggest that there were alternatives possible, both for the out-
comes of particular cases and for the theories of the Act's
interpretation that emerged. Such an argument, it is hoped, makes
it possible for all of us to break through the appearance of inevita-
bility and re-envision the fundamental issues of the legal organiza-
tion of labor relations.20
Professor Finkin profoundly disagrees with my overall ap-
proach and my conclusions about the possibility and desirability of
other means of organizing collective bargaining. Here I would like
to pick out some of the major areas where we join issue to see how
and in what ways we disagree.
I. THE PLURALIST POSTULATE
Professor Finkin rejects one of the central ideas in my article-
that the particular ways in which the N.L.R.A. was interpreted were
up for grabs and could have evolved differently. He claims that I
arrive at this "pluralist postulate" by what he characterizes as a "co-
terie theory of legal history," in which a "bunch of lawyers and
economists-primarily identified with Harvard University"-fash-
ioned an ideology and foisted it on the "willing instrument" of the
United States Supreme Court.2' He then attempts to refute his ren-
dition of my argument by saying that what I call a post-war para-
digm is to be found "not in post-war theorizing but in the
philosophy of the labor Act."2 2 Thus he concludes that, by the logic
of "Occam's razor," the "pluralist postulate becomes super-
flUOUS." '2 3
20. My notion that there is such a paradigm of collective bargaining is itself a prod-
uct of history. Only now after several decades ofjudicial interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act and the concomitant experience of fully legalized and "mature"
collective bargaining, has it become clear that alternative interpretations of various pro-
visions of the Act are possible, and that the pattern of interpretation which actually
emerged is the product of a number of choices which, taken together, reflect a particular
ideology.
21. Finkin, supra note 4, at 55. See also id. at 88 ("In Stone's piece, the United States
Supreme Court is a passive instrument.").
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id.
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He presents his argument by discussing three of the five pro-
positions that I identified as the basic tenets of industrial plural-
ism,24 and says they can be found in either the legislative history of
the Act2 5 or in the " 'practice and philosophy of collective bargain-
ing' as it had developed out of the experience of the American labor
movement." 26 Significantly, he omits the two tenets that are the
most central to the industrial pluralist vision. They are the beliefs
that: "(2) private arbitration is a necessary element in the work-
place mini-democracy; [and] (3) in order to foster arbitration and to
ensure the functioning of the mini-democracy, the processes of the
state must not intervene. '27 I demonstrate in my article that these
two omitted tenets constitute the backbone of the paradigm, for
they, taken together, define the centrality of private arbitration and
prescribe the noninterventionist stance of the courts. By omitting
them from his discussion, Finkin ignores the crux of my argument.28
Despite the fact that Professor Finkin's razor omits the two cru-
cial tenets, his interpretation is still wrong in several respects. In the
first place, my article nowhere says that any small group of conspira-
tors tricked anyone to get them to interpret the Act in a particular
way. To the contrary, I clearly state at the beginning of my piece
that the paradigm I am describing was a vision of collective bargain-
ing that was widely shared in the post-war era-shared by policy-
makers, the framers of the statute, the judges who interpreted it,
and the academics who advocated and analyzed it. Thus, I say in my
Introduction: "This article argues that the industrial pluralist
model of collective bargaining represents an ideology shared by
legal theorists, judges, industrial sociologists, and labor economists
in the post-war era."29 I am not describing a conspiracy; rather, I
am describing a pervasive set of views. Such shared sets of views are
24. Stone, supra note 3, at 1516. These propositions are:
(1) the workplace under collective bargaining can be analogized to a political
democracy; (2) private arbitration is a necessary element in the workplace mini-
democracy; (3) in order to foster arbitration and to ensure the functioning of
the mini-democracy, the processes of the state must not intervene; (4) individ-
ual rights in collective bargaining must yield to the collective rights of the
union; and (5) under the Act, labor's only rights are to bargain collectively and
to arbitrate its disputes with its employer.
25. Finkin, supra note 4, at 56-58.
26. Id. at 57.
27. Stone, supra note 3, at 1516.
28. Similarly, at a later point Finkin says that "with the exception of arbitration, [Stone]
declines to connect the case treatment to the pluralist postulate." Finkin, supra note 4, at
58 (emphasis added). Since my argument is primarily about the centrality of arbitration
and its effects in the developing case law, this is no small "exception."
29. Stone, supra note 3, at 1515.
1986] 985
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
what I mean by "ideology."" ° The individuals I discuss, and many
others too numerous to mention, shared a common view of collec-
tive bargaining that led them to formulate problems and advocate
solutions in a particular way-not out of dissembling, but out of
honest and well intentioned belief.
Just as I do not claim that certain legal academics duped the
Justices of the Supreme Court, neither do I claim that the true pur-
poses of the legislators were warped by this (or any) group of schol-
ars. Indeed, it would not surprise me if some of the legislators who
drafted the National Labor Relations Act shared the view as well.
This would not refute my postulate but rather would confirm it.
The difference between Professor Finkin and me on this point
reflects a basic methodological difference. Professor Finkin sug-
gests that if a belief is pervasive, it is in some sense true, and that to
study it is a waste of time. I believe, on the other hand, that it is just
such beliefs that most warrant critical examination because belief
structures and ideologies are part of what constitute the real world.
They have an important influence on human behavior and the
course of events. By articulating and analyzing shared beliefs and
paradigms, we achieve a critical distance that enables us to reevalu-
ate them, and possibly to reconstitute our reality. 31
There is a further flaw in Professor Finkin's critique of the
30. Contrary to Finkin's assertion that at no point do I explain what I mean by the
term "ideology," Finkin, supra note 4, at 84 n.278, I state at the outset that:
Ideology is an elusive concept whose meaning has been defined differently by
various writers. For the purposes of this article, I define ideology as the set of
categories with which one views the world. Individuals and societies formulate
categories in order to navigate in the world. Individuals need categories in
order to organize experience and to act .... These categories are abstractions
of experience and observation; they embody both a description of the world
and a prescription for action. It is the formal coherence of such categories that
I call "ideology."
Stone, supra note 3, at 1515 n.28 (citation omitted).
31. By identifying and separating out the vision of reality embedded in the law from
the reality itself, we learn something about the role law plays in shaping social interac-
tions. Thus, I am interested in describing the disjuncture between labor law and the
actuality of class relations in our society-disembedding the law from social existence-
so that we can see how the law functions ideologically.
In a book rightly renowned for its theoretical as well as its historical contribution,
Karl Polayni in THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1973) discusses how the science of eco-
nomics only emerged once the market system developed, so that it became possible to
imagine such a thing as an "economy" disembedded from general social relations. In a
much less ambitious way, I am suggesting that class relations can be disembedded from
the labor laws that regulate them, and from the particular ideas about collective bargain-
ing that have come to dominate most thinking about class relations.
986 [VOL. 45:978
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"pluralist postulate."' 32 In his repeated assertions that the paradigm
is "superfluous" because it is to be found "in the philosophy of the
labor Act" 3 and/or that it "developed out of the experience of the
American labor movement,"' 34 he betrays too simplistic a view of
history. Presumably we are all aware that any claim about the philos-
ophy of any act of Congress is highly suspect. The legislature does
not speak with a single voice; even less does it formulate its texts
with a single thought or philosophy. Finkin does not cite any legal
text or court decision as his authority for the proposition that there
is such a thing as a "legislative philosophy" of the Act. The only
source Finkin provides is a statement by the historian Howell Harris
about the philosophy of the Wagner Act.35 Finkin provides no au-
thority at all for the claim that there is such a thing as the "legisla-
tive philosophy" of the National Labor Relations Act. This is no small
matter because it is that Act, not the Wagner Act, that is the subject
of my article.3 6
Professor Finkin's claim that there is one " 'practice and philos-
ophy of collective bargaining,' [that] developed out of the experi-
ence of the American labor movement" 37 is even more dubious than
32. Finkin, supra note 4, at 56.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 57.
35. Id. at 56 n.134 and accompanying text (emphasis added). Finkin cites as author-
ity H. HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS IN THE 1940s (1982), to demonstrate that there is such a thing as a "philoso-
phy of the labor Act." Finkin, supra note 4, at 56. The quote from Harris indicates that
this supposed "philosophy" is the "philosophy" of the original 1935 Act, not the "phi-
losophy" of the 1947 amendments. However, it is unfair to Harris' book to use it as
authority for the philosophy of the 1935 Act. The book is about the 1940s, and Harris
has only one paragraph in the book in which he even discusses the passage of the origi-
nal Wagner Act. HARRIS, supra, at 22; and there he gives only the most general and
broad summary of its provisions. The book nowhere purports to recount the "philoso-
phy of the Wagner Act." Rather, the quote upon which Finkin relies is an off-hand, and
not particularly well-chosen, phrase in Harris' book in which he equates a belief in the
" 'the Wagner Act's legislative philosophy'" with a belief in collective bargaining in the
most general sense.
36. If Professor Finkin wanted to use the Harris book to establish a single "philoso-
phy" of the 1947 Act, he would have been hard-pressed. The book shows that there was
not one single, unified philosophy of collective bargaining underlying the 1947 Act, but
at least two different philosophies-that of organized labor and that of the business
community. Harris also argues that there were at least two distinctly different philoso-
phies within the business community itself, HARRIS, supra note 35, at 179, and that the
statute that emerged (which he characterizes as "complex and poorly drafted," id. at
125) was a complicated composite of those views, together with the views of the mem-
bers of Congress involved and some of their particularly powerful constituencies. See id.
at 123-24.
37. Finkin, supra note 4 at 57 (quotingI.l. Case v. NL.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 338
(1944)).
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his claim that the Act had one "legislative philosophy." For this
proposition Finkin gives only two citations: an autobiographical
work byJohn Commons,3" and a reference toJ.I. Case v. N.L.R.B.39
The passage cited inJ.I. Case states that the "philosophy and practice
of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on . .. individual ad-
vantages."40 Similarly, the quote from Commons says that in his
experience, "the meaning of collective action in control of individ-
ual action" was a basic principle in the labor movement. These cita-
tions are relevant to one of my tenets-that "individual rights in
collective bargaining must yield to the collective rights of the
union"4 '-in fact they support it. However, they certainly are not
adequate as authority for the entire jurisprudence of collective bar-
gaining that emerged under Section 301 of the N.L.R.A. In factJI.
Case was decided before Section 301 was enacted and, as I explain in
my article, the Court's treatment of collective bargaining in that case
"was not a wholesale adoption of the industrial pluralist perspec-
tive. "42 The Commons autobiography was written in 1934, before
the Wagner Act was even passed.
Finkin's characterization of the "practice and philosophy of the
American labor movement" ignores almost one hundred years of
debate and discussion, both within and without the American labor
movement, about the best form for union organization and about
the best means for unions to better the conditions of working peo-
ple. Within American labor history, there have been many different
practices and philosophies of collective bargaining. Participants in
and scholars of that history have drawn sharply different conclusions
from the same experiences. To suggest that the labor movement
looks back over its own history, understands it in one single way,
and draws from it one unified conclusion-as Professor Finkin
seems to do-is to ignore the many complex, rich, and passionate
debates which have persisted for generations among the move-
ment's activists and philosophers.
If there is no single "basic philosophy of the Labor Act" or "ex-
perience of the American labor movement," it cannot be said that
the interpretations of the Act that I describe in my article were nec-
essary or inevitable. Neither were they mandated by the bare lan-
38. J. COMMONS, MYSELF (1934), discussed at Finkin, supra note 4, at 57 n.143.
39. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
40. Id. at 338.
41. Stone, supra note 3, at 1516.
42. Id. at 1522.
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guage of the statute itself.4" Thus, there was necessarily an
interpretive process that led to the doctrinal developments I de-
scribe. Finkin describes these developments as "well worked
ground,"44 but he does not succeed in providing an alternative ex-
planation for the particular constellation of interpretations that
emerged. Thus, it seems that far from being superfluous, the "plu-
ralist postulate" stands.
II. RETAINED MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Just as Professor Finkin rejects the idea that industrial pluralism
was the result of a particular interpretation of the Act, rather than
an immanent aspect of it, so too does he reject my argument that the
pluralist interpretation created the illusion, but not the reality, of
industrial democracy. Thus, he criticizes my discussion of retained
management rights, in which I attempt to show that the realm of
democracy in the hypothetical mini-democracy is both small and
vulnerable. Finkin claims that I carefully select which writers I in-
clude in "the circle of pluralists"4 5 and then "take[] the fact of disa-
greement among the writers to evidence the 'collapse' of the
pluralist 'structure' without entertaining the possibility that such a
'structure,' in the sense [I] would have it, never existed." 46 He calls
this a "transparent device":
Select a group of independent-minded scholars, who agree
at a great many points, but disagree at others; attribute to
43. All of the legal developments I trace involve interpretations of Section 301(a) of
the 1947 Act. Its bare sixty words say:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Upon these sparse words, the Court erected the entire juris-
prudence of favoring arbitration and promoting it as the only forum for redressing
breaches of collective bargaining agreements.
It cannot be maintained that in deciding such cases as Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the three cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy,
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), or Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261
(1964), the Supreme Court was simply applying the statute. This would be a rather
naive claim in any context, but particularly far-fetched in relation to the text of Section
301 (a).
44. Finkin, supra note 4, at 63.
45. Id. at 62.
46. Id. at 63.
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them a common ideology (which, to the best of my knowl-
edge, they have never attributed to themselves); show
where they differ among themselves; and, conclude that
their ideology is fatally flawed by "incoherence." Q.E.D.4 7
Unfortunately, here Finkin has read my article incorrectly. I do
indeed argue that the industrial pluralist paradigm does not offer a
coherent solution to the problem of retained management rights,
but not in the way that he claims I do. That is, I argue that the
analogy of the workplace to a mini-democracy and the justificatory
logic that goes with the analogy suggest that those issues over which
the union might want input should be up for grabs, both at the bar-
gaining table and in the grievance procedure. I then show that this
has never been the interpretation given by the architects and most
vocal advocates of industrial pluralism. I suggest that even those
most committed to the paradigm have not taken it that far, because
to put all issues of concern to workers up for grabs would seriously
challenge their notions of the entailments of private property.48
Thus, I maintain that none of the industrial pluralists embraces a
pure joint sovereignty perspective. They all believe, to varying ex-
tents, in the existence of some inherent retained management
rights. I then show that while none of the advocates can embrace a
pure joint sovereignty position, neither does any have a satisfactory
way of defining in a logical way which issues belong in the sphere of
joint control and which issues are retained management rights.
To demonstrate my claim, I go through the published writings
of some of the leading industrial pluralists to see if they reconcile
the contradiction between the assertion of retained management
rights and the pluralist theory of joint decision-making. I choose
several writers who have decidedly different perspectives within the
paradigm, to try to give a fair range of approaches. I take them up
seriatim and show how each one, in his own terms, fails to articulate a
coherent boundary principle to reconcile the two conflicting princi-
ples.49 I do not compare them one to the other, contrary to Finkin's
claim.
My discussion does indeed conclude with the observation that
the leading industrial pluralists display a "uniform descent into in-
coherence... when they confront the problem of retained manage-
ment rights."5 But, as the text makes clear, the incoherency is not
47. Id.
48. Stone, supra note 3, at 1558.
49. Id. at 1552-57.
50. Id. at 1557.
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because the scholars I discuss disagree with each other, but because
none of them, taken alone, solves the fundamental problem of decid-
ing which issues are in the realm of democratic decision-making and
which are in the realm of retained management rights. That is,
none of them reconciles a belief in retained rights with the idea of
joint sovereignty.
To refute me on this point, Finkin would have to show a logical
solution to the retained rights problem-whether his own or some-
one else's. He does not even try. Instead, he dismisses my claim
that no scholar has provided an adequate solution to the problem by
saying merely that the problem of retained rights is one to which
"various authors have proposed equally various solutions. ' 5 1 Not a
single citation is offered.
Rather than taking the issue of retained rights seriously, Finkin
asks why I choose such a select few among the circle of pluralists I
discuss and do not include Professors Clyde Summers or Jack
Getman. The answer should be obvious. My piece is about the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements. Professor Summers'
major writings have been about the relationship between individual
rights and collective rights.52 Professor Getman's major works are
about the processes by which unions are organized. Both of these
are important subjects in labor relations, but they are not the sub-
jects of my article.
No doubt my point about retained rights could have been
demonstrated by discussing the work of other scholars, perhaps
even the ones Finkin criticizes me for omitting. But in discussing an
ideology, one must necessarily analyze it as it is expressed by some
of its spokespeople. I select several major scholars to discuss, each
of whom takes a somewhat different approach to the question. I do
this to show that even within the range of discourse in the paradigm,
none of the approaches presented yields a satisfactory answer to the
retained rights-joint sovereignty dilemma.54
51. Finkin, supra note 4, at 61.
52. See, e.g., Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and
the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1082 (1984); The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Con-
stitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977).
53. See, e.g., J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & E. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATIVE ELEC-
TIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976); Getman, The Challenges of Organizing, I 1 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 57 (1982-1983).
54. Since the appearance of my article, several scholars have attempted to develop a
principle by which to divide the realm of retained rights from that ofjoint sovereignty.
See, e.g., Harper, Leveling the Road From Borg- Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope
of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1462-84 (1982) (arguing for a "product
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My point about the retained rights controversy is that even
those who most adamantly profess their belief in industrial plural-
ism and the possibility ofjoint sovereignty do not embrace this posi-
tion wholeheartedly or provide a means to reconcile it with their
equally adamant belief in retained management rights. This is not
an accusation of hypocrisy. Rather, it is a claim that there is a deep
and irreconcilable contradiction in the industrial pluralist theory
itself.55
Professor Finkin also makes the error of treating my discussion
of retained rights as if it pertains only to the scope of mandatory
bargaining under the Act. What Finkin ignores, and what lies at the
heart of my discussion of retained rights, is my claim that the re-
tained rights issue arises over and over again in different guises.
Thus, I argue that the question about retained rights, which arises in
the context of defining the scope of the duty to bargain, is the same
issue as, for example, the issue of how an arbitrator should decide a
case that turns on the existence vel non of a silent clause in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, or the issue of how a court should decide
a question of arbitrability in a dispute over a silent term.56 My point
about many versions of the retained rights controversy is that the
problem of delineating the two realms is pervasive and compel-
ling.57 Furthermore, my larger point about the pluralists' inability
market principle" to delineate the scope of mandatory bargaining); Note, Worker Partici-
pation: Industrial Democracy and Managerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Swe-
den and the United States, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 128-33 (1984) (arguing
that a modified version of the First National Maintenance balancing test would provide a
reasoned basis to delineate the realm of mandatory bargaining). These efforts do not
provide a rational basis for distinguishing the two realms, because each one's proposed
criteria are too vague and malleable to withstand scrutiny. Detailed analysis of these
proposals is beyond the scope of this piece. Here I merely wish to note that only re-
cently has the effort even been made.
55. Professor Finkin ignores the essence of my argument about retained rights when
he purports to summarize it. He says "the claim of'incoherence' rests upon a syllogism:
The law of collective bargaining announced by the Supreme Court adopts the pluralist
ideology; Borg-Warner constricts the scope of bargaining in a way that is inconsistent with
that ideology; therefore the pluralist ideology is fatally flawed." Finkin, supra note 4, at
60. My argument had nothing to do with Borg-Warner, a case that I mention only once, in
a footnote. Stone, supra note 3, at 1547 n.207. True, my argument had to do with the
manner in which the Court and others distinguish between mandatory and permissive
bargaining. Id. at 1552-57. But I am less concerned with the fact of the distinction than
I am with the means by which the distinction is made and justified in particular cases.
See, e.g., id. at 1578-79 (industrial pluralism cannot explain why the realm ofjoint sover-
eignty will grow rather than shrink).
56. Stone, supra note 3, at 1548-52.
57. Even if my argument about retained rights were relevant only to delineating the
scope of mandatory bargaining, it would nonetheless be an important aspect of the plu-
ralist edifice. Although some commentators have stated that the distinction is immate-
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to delineate the boundaries of the mini-democracy is that the theory
cannot, despite its claims, create or defend any particular definition
of democracy in the workplace.
III. THE PRIVATIZATION DEBATE
Professor Finkin focuses much of his disagreement with me on
my discussion of the role of private ordering in collective bargain-
ing. It is here that he most pointedly disputes my claim that there
are alternative ways of organizing collective bargaining. My priva-
tization point begins with a discussion of the leading cases of Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills58 and the Steelworkers Trilogy,59 the cases
in which the Supreme Court selected the private forum of arbitra-
rial in practice because a strong union can always devise a strategy that will achieve
bargaining on a permissive item, see, e.g., Feller, Response to Stone, The Structure of Post-War
Labor Relations, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 136 (1982-1983), the mandatory-per-
missive distinction has an importance for unions that goes far beyond what is or is not
discussed at the bargaining table. Perhaps the distinction's primary significance is that
when one side has failed to bargain and a strike ensues, the distinction determines
whether a strike is protected or not, and thus whether strikers who engage in strike
activity have a right to reinstatement. Stone, supra note 3, at 1547 n.207. That is, when
the employer has failed to bargain over a mandatory item, or has insisted on a nonman-
datory item to impasse, the strikers have a right to reinstatement. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v.
Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer's unilateral change
in piece rates and production quotas without bargaining with union was Section 8(a)(5)
violation, so that ensuing strike was unfair labor practice strike, making strikers entitled
to reinstatement.); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 602 F.2d
73, 78 (4th Cir. 1979) (employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by insisting on a nonmandatory
item to impasse, so that ensuing strike was unfair labor practice strike, entitling strikers
to reinstatement). If the alleged failure to bargain is merely over a permissive item, any
ensuing strike is deemed an economic strike, and strikers do not have automatic rein-
statement rights. See N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)
(if employer had bargained in good faith with union and strike ensued, employer justi-
fied in hiring permanent replacements). Thus, the mandatory or non-mandatory nature
of an item is crucial in many strike situations. Indeed, some commentators have noted
that the mandatory-permissive distinction defines those issues over which a union is free
to exercise economic weapons and those on which it is not. See, e.g., Harper, supra, note
54, at 1447 ("employers and unions... may not resort to economic pressure to obtain
agreement unless the proposal concerns 'wages, hours, [or] other terms and conditions
of employment' ") (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)); Note, Worker Participation, supra
note 54, at 99 ("a finding that a subject is not mandatory means that if a party refuses to
discuss the matter, the other party may not bring any economic pressure"); Atleson,
Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings, and the NLRA, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
83, 92 (1982-1983) ("Most judicial and Board decisions ... have attempted to place
restraints on the unlimited use of economic power by mapping out areas in which
mandatory bargaining is to occur.").
58. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
59. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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tion as the preferred method for resolving disputes which arise
under collective bargaining agreements. These cases established
the proposition that unions and individual workers are required to
use arbitration to decide disputes involving an alleged breach of a
collective agreement (when arbitration clauses exist), and may not
sue in court for breach of contract.6 ° My analysis concludes that the
institutional implications of the industrial pluralist paradigm rele-
gated labor-management disputes arising during the life of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to a private forum. 61
Finkin does not disagree with my characterization of the Act's
dominant interpretation as a privatization of labor disputes. Rather,
he disputes my attitude toward it.62 His disagreement operates on
several levels: he has a normative disagreement with me as to the
desirability of a public versus a private forum for resolving labor
issues; he disputes my contention that there was another possibility
presented either by the statute or in its history; he proposes a read-
ing of the statute's legislative history to the effect that my posited
interpretation is contrary to legislative intent; and he proposes his
own solution to the tension I claim exists between public interven-
tion and private ordering, a solution that he claims preserves the
purely private forum for contract adjudication.
On the normative level, Finkin challenges my implicit claim that
privatization of disputes about the enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements is not a good thing for labor. He makes his nor-
mative argument by stating that if workers do not want their
disputes decided in a private arena, they can insist that their unions
explicitly reserve in their collective bargaining agreements the right
to go to court or the right to strike over grievances.63 Because
60. Stone, supra note 3, at 1530.
61. Id. at 1529-30. Finkin quotes my statement that under industrial pluralism work-
ers and unions are "deprive[d]" of a judicial forum, and says he finds my use of the
concept of deprivation in this context "mildly puzzling." Finkin, supra note 4, at 65.
However, he omits my authority, a well-known dissent by Justice Black in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 664 (1968) (BlackJ., dissenting), in which Justice Black
says that because of the Court's excessive deference to arbitration, "workers lose their
rights to appeal to the courts for redress." See Stone, supra note 3, at 1530 n. 114 and
accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 4, at 55 (concerning Stone's "extraordinary distaste
for the emphasis pluralist ideology places on private ordering"); id. ("it is not altogether
clear who or what is the object of [Stone's] ire"); id. at 64 ("The theme that pervades the
discussion of both arbitration and fair representation is Stone's distaste for private or-
dering."); id. at 65 (concerning "Stone's distaste for the idea of private ordering"); id. at
85 ("Stone is downright hostile to the real world.")
63. Id. at 65.
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unions do not do this, he concludes, they must not see it as
advantageous.
This is a good point, and well worth answering. But first I need
to make my position clear. I never took the position that unions
would be better off reserving the right to self-help every time the
employer breaches the collective bargaining agreement.64 In most
cases, a union can only call a successful strike when the issue in-
volved is very serious or has a significant impact on a large number
of people in the bargaining unit. Not all issues are experienced as
sufficiently serious or pervasive to permit a strike mobilization.
Thus, if the strike weapon were the sole weapon unions had to rem-
edy employer breaches of collective agreements, unions would be
effectively helpless to enforce many contractual provisions.
I also agree with Professor Finkin that in many cases unions are
reluctant to seek a judicial forum for enforcement of their collective
bargaining agreements because they fear that to do so would entail
tremendous expense and delay. This may, however, stem from a
misperception. Recent studies suggest that arbitration is becoming
as expensive as litigation, and is taking, on average, almost as
long.65 Furthermore, the Act, as presently constituted, does not
give mandatory priority in the federal courts to Section 301 cases, so
even if there were a right to sue to enforce a collective agreement,
the judicial system would probably move slowly.6 6 Thus, if the only
64. Id. Professor Finkin attributes this position to Professor Karl Klare, not to me.
However, he includes it in his discussion of my piece, and suggests that it is a position I
also share.
65. For a long time it was assumed that arbitration was faster and less expensive than
adjudication. See, e.g., Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements,
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 253 (1950). Over the past few years, many have observed that
this is not always true, or at least not as true as it was. In 1983, Byron Abernethy,
President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, acknowledged that in certain areas
arbitration had proven to be "something less than initially hoped for .... [W]ith the
greater legalisms and greater use of lawyers, transcripts, posthearing briefs, and declin-
ing informality, in some instances it may have become more expensive as well as more
time-consuming." Abernethy, The Presidential Address: The Promise and the Performance of
Arbitration: A Personal Perspective, in ARBITRATION PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE, PROC.
THIRTY-SIXTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1, 10 (1983). See also Feller, Arbitration:
The Days ofIts Glory are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. LJ. 97, 97-98 (1977) (one cannot base a
claim to the superiority of arbitration on speed and informality; certain judicial proce-
dures like small claims court and injunctions are more flexible and faster than any
known form of arbitration).
66. Both federal and state courts give calendar preferences to certain types of cases.
For example, the federal courts give a mandatory preference to criminal cases. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 50(a) (in the federal district courts, "[p]reference shall be given to criminal
proceedings as far as practicable"). See also E.D.N.Y. CRIM. R. 1 (a) app. ("Insofar as is
practicable: (a) the trial of criminal cases shall be given preference over civil cases, as
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available options are litigation in a federal court or arbitration,
many unions would no doubt choose arbitration, at least for most
grievances, even though it lacks the full range of due process guar-
antees of a federal court.
However, I suggest that those were not the only options: There
was a logical third alternative that never received adequate consider-
ation. That alternative is adjudication of breach of contract cases by
the National Labor Relations Board.6 7 The Board is the most obvi-
ous and probably most appropriate forum for deciding allegations
of breaches of collective bargaining agreements. It has an immense
adjudicative capability and the expertise to resolve disputes of this
type at least equal to that of private arbitrators. In my article, I
point out that all of the arguments for the superiority of arbitra-
tion-expertise, informality, and flexibility-are equally true of the
N.L.R.B., and that such an arrangement "would have quieted the
systemic fears expressed that such breach of contract suits would
swamp the courts."6 I also argue that support for this alternative
can be found in the language of the statute through an expansive
provided by Rule 50(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."). Similarly, certain kinds
of civil cases are given priority in some state courts. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
3403 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986) (creating trial preferences for, inter alia, actions
involving parties who are age seventy or older, and actions alleging medical or dental
malpractice). See also, N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-c (McKinney Supp. 1986) (providing a
preference that citizen-taxpayer actions "shall have preference over all other causes in
all courts").
If such a mandatory preference were provided for Section 301 cases, or if there
were special small claims types of procedures available, the option of litigation would
undoubtedly be more appealing to unions.
67. Stone, supra note 3, at 1531. There might well be other alternatives such as a
system of mandatory priority for breach of contract cases by workers and unions in the
federal courts, with increased use of procedural devices like magistrates, special masters
and summary judgment.
My argument in favor of giving the N.L.R.B. jurisdiction over allegations of
breaches of collective bargaining agreements is an argument against privatization of the
Act, and in favor of an interpretation that facilitates public intervention to implement
the stated goal of fostering equality of bargaining power between management and la-
bor. This does not mean that I blindly approve of everything the current National Labor
Relations Board does, nor that I find it more pro-labor than arbitrators. Rather, I be-
lieve that if there were a public forum to decide questions concerning the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements, the results would be more pro-labor in the long run
because the Board would receive more public scrutiny and be more accountable to the
electorate than it presently is. I further believe that by bringing issues of concern to
labor into a public arena, the public life of our society would be enriched. That is, if
labor issues were up for grabs in the political arena, our national political debate would
come to reflect people's real concerns, voter participation would be enhanced, and as a
result, our society, as well as the workplace, would become more democratic. See Stone,
supra note 3, at 1580.
68. Id.
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reading of the Board's Section 8(a)(1) jurisdiction 69 and a commit-
ment to implementing Section 10(a).7 °
Finkin does not discuss this suggestion at the normative level.
Rather, he dismisses my suggestion with the comment that in 1947
Congress explicitly rejected a provision that would have made
breach of a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice
within the jurisdiction of the Board. 7' However, even if my propo-
sal were totally at odds with some unequivocal "congressional in-
tent," that is no reason to utterly dismiss it. One of the tasks of legal
scholarship is to suggest alternatives and thereby broaden the pa-
rameters of discussion, with the possibility of influencing decision-
makers and statute-framers in the future. And one of the points of
my article, a point which Professor Finkin's indignation demon-
strates, is that the paradigm of industrial pluralism has not only con-
stricted the universe of options, it has also constricted our
imagination.72
Furthermore, the statute's legislative history is not as clear as
Professor Finkin would have us believe. The first version of what
became the 1947 amendments to the Act did indeed contain a provi-
sion that made it a union or employer unfair labor practice "[t]o
violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement or the terms
69. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). That provision states: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
70. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). That provision states, in pertinent part:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
(Emphasis added.)
Recently, in N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984), the Supreme
Court gave such an expansive interpretation of Section 8(a)(1) by holding that actions by
union members to enforce a collective bargaining agreement were "concerted activity"
within the meaning of the Act. Thus, the Court upheld the Board's finding that an em-
ployer who discharged an employee for taking an action which the collective agreement
authorized had violated Section 8(a)(1). (The Court remanded for a determination as to
whether the activity was also "protected.") This decision has been criticized for under-
mining private collective bargaining by providing an end-run around the contractual
grievance procedure. See, e.g., Bethel, Recent Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 45
MD. L. REV. 179, 185 (1986)
71. Finkin, supra note 4, at 66.
72. See also Lesnick, Response to Stone, The Structure of Post-War Labor Relations, 11
N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE, 142, 145 (judicial and arbitration decisions have
become increasingly pro-management over time, but many lose sight of that because
"our norms have changed little by little over the years").
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of an agreement to submit a labor dispute to arbitration. ' 73 This
provision was deleted in the final version with almost no discus-
sion, 4 as Professor Finkin correctly points out.
The Conference Report on the final bill gave an opaque, one
sentence explanation as to why it had deleted this proposal from the
final bill. It said, "Once parties have made a collective bargaining
contract, the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of law and not to the National Labor Relations Board."-75
There was no further explanation.
Despite this virtual silence76 by the Conference Committee as
to why the revision was made, there is evidence in the hearings,
committee deliberations and floor debates on the bill which sug-
gests a different conclusion than Professor Finkin proffers. In the
deliberations that gave rise to the bill, there was considerable dis-
cussion about the problem of the lack of enforceability of collective
bargaining agreements. Virtually all the speakers who addressed
that question took for granted that collective bargaining agreements
were enforceable against employers in state courts and that the
problem that needed to be addressed was how to make them en-
forceable against unions. To that effect, several different proposals
were made, including forcing unions to incorporate so as to acquire
legal personality and thus be amenable to suit, 7 7 and withdrawing
N.L.R.B. certification and bargaining rights from unions that breach
their no-strike pledges. 7' The proposal that a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement be an unfair labor practice was another sug-
gestion to the same effect. With that proposal, as with the others,
the discussion was primarily about its effect on unions that breached
73. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 13, 16 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 114 (1949).
74. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-42 (1947).
75. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-42 (1947), quoted in Finkin, supra
note 4, at 66.
76. The Supreme Court warned in a related context, " 'It is at best treacherous to
find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.'" Boys
Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (quoting
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)) (congressional silence following Sin-
clair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1963), did not constitute adoption of the
doctrine that federal courts were precluded from issuing injunctions pursuant to Section
301).
77. See Hearings on Amendments to the NLRA Before the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (statement of Mr. Cook), reprinted in 2 AMENDMENTS TO THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 533 (1947).
78. See Hearings on Amendments to the NLRA Before the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 80th
Cong., 1st. Sess. 26 (1947) (statement of Mr. Landis), reprinted in 2 AMENDMENTS TO THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 545-56 (1947).
998 [VOL. 45:978
RE-ENVISIONING LABOR LAW
no-strike clauses by engaging in strikes while a contract was in ef-
fect. This proposal, along with the others, was rejected in favor of
Section 301, apparently in the belief that Section 301 would give
federal courts jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments against both unions and employers in ordinary breach of con-
tract actions-most particularly against unions. 79 To this effect, the
final Conference Committee explained its decision to omit the pro-
posal from the final version of the bill and to include Section 301 as
a choice to leave parties, for the enforcement of their agreements, to
the "usual processes of the law .... '
This more expanded reading of the legislative history suggests
that the legislators expected, and in fact intended, that Section 301
would create jurisdiction in the federal courts for adjudication on the
merits of cases involving breaches of collective bargaining agree-
ments. Thus, if congressional intent were the decisive guide, then
Justice Douglas was way out of line in the Lincoln Mills decision. The
doctrine he developed there, and in subsequent cases,8" of judicial
deference to arbitration, was a vast departure from this reading of
congressional intent.82
This expanded account of the history of Section 301 also sug-
gests that the policy of promoting arbitration over all other forms of
dispute resolution, which Professor Finkin suggests can be found in
the "legislative philosophy" of the statute itself, was not quite as
firmly entrenched as he would have us believe. Rather, upon read-
ing the legislative history, one is struck by how committed the legis-
lators were to judicial enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.
My proposal that the National Labor Relations Board adjudi-
cate breach of contract claims, while it does not follow directly from
this history, is at least as consistent with both the language and the
79. See Wollett & Wellington, Federation and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 445, 472-74 (1955) (arguing that Section 301 was primarily concerned with remov-
ing procedural barriers to suits against labor unions).
80. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-42, (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947 545-46 (1949).
81. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
82. Many other commentators have criticized Justice Douglas' treatment of congres-
sional intent in Section 301 on similar grounds. See, e.g., Aaron, On First Looking into the
Lincoln Mills Decision, in ARBITRATION AND THE LAW: PROC. TWELFTH ANN. MEETING,
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1, 2 (1959) (concerning the "awesome spectacle" ofJustice Douglas
"scal[ing] the formidable barrier of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and .. .skirt[ing] the
treacherous crevasse of the U.S. Arbitration Act" to decide the Lincoln Mills case as he
did); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1957) (Lincoln Mills represented failure of judicial process).
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history of the statute as the privatization approach embraced byJus-
tice Douglas in Lincoln Mills.83 In fact, neither the language nor the
history of Section 301 provide an answer to the question of whether
labor disputes should be decided in a public or a private forum.8 4
Rather, in deciding that question, the Court had to make a norma-
tive choice-a choice which is, or at least should be, fair game for
criticism and debate.
One aspect of my critique of the Court's choice of privatization
83. One further point bears making. At the time of the 1947 amendments, the
N.L.R.B. was routinely deciding breach of contract claims in many contexts, within its
existing unfair labor practice jurisdiction. For example, in Consolidated Aircraft Corp.
v. N.L.R.B., 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944), the court affirmed the Board's finding that the
employer had violated the union's Section 7 rights and thus Section 8(a)(1) by unilater-
ally cancelling contractual wage increases and by refusing to comply with the contractual
grievance and arbitration provisions for certain other disputes. Similarly, in Marlboro
Cotton Mills, 53 N.L.R.B. 965 (1943), the Board found that the union president had not
violated the collective bargaining agreement and that his discharge consequently vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3). In Carrolls Transfer Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944), the Board
found that a company's violation of the closed shop clause in the collective agreement
was a violation of Section 8(a)(5). Also, in U.S. Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124, 133-
34 (1944), the Board interpreted the scope of the arbitration clauses and required the
employer to utilize them.
Courts in the pre-1947 period used a "public right" doctrine, inter alia, to delineate
the scope of N.L.R.B. jurisdiction in cases where there were other remedies available.
Under that doctrine, the existence of a public right, as compared to a mere private right,
was the precondition for N.L.R.B. jurisdiction; if such a public right existed, there was
no deferral to private dispute resolution. That is, the courts had a conception of a pub-
lic right in the administration of the Act that enabled the courts to decide when the
Board should have jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of other remedial fora and
when it should not. Thus, for example, in N.L.R.B. v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120
F.2d 262, 268 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941), the court decided that an
employee could secure redress at the N.L.R.B. for her alleged wrongful discharge be-
cause a public right was implicated. The court said that despite the possible existence of
remedies for her "private right" under the contract or in the state courts, "the existence
of such a private right. . . in no way affects the public right or the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board to enforce it." Professor Klare has discussed the public right doctrine in
other contexts, such as its use to delineate who can be parties to proceedings to enforce
Board orders and how bargaining units are determined. See Klare, supra note 5, at 310-
18. See also National Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 362-64 (1940) (Board prop-
erly found employer had committed an unfair labor practice by negotiating individual
contracts with its employees even though affected employees were not parties to the
Board proceeding because Board was asserting a "public right").
Thus, it is entirely possible that Section 301 was not intended to curtail existing
Board jurisdiction but only to provide another forum, at least for those cases which did
not fall within the Board's jurisdictional net. If so, then there is no justification for the
Court's diminishing the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, as it did in Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964), and some of
the other the cases I discuss. See Stone, supra note 3, at 1531-38.
84. See N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1967) (legislative
history of Section 301 does not mean Board is without power to decide any questions of
interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
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is that it creates a recurring and irreconcilable tension between pri-
vate ordering and public intervention, and has led to unworkable
doctrinal structures. To demonstrate my point, I discuss the leading
case of Vaca v. Sipes,"5 a case which involved claims that the union
had breached its duty of fair representation,"6 and that the employer
had breached the collective agreement. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction for both a breach
of duty claim against a union and a breach of contract claim against
an employer, but that the latter claim cannot be heard until the
union's breach of its duty is established."
In practice, the Vaca decision means that an individual who has
suffered from an employer breach of a collective agreement must
prove wrongdoing on the part of the union as well as the employer
in order to recover. This is cumbersome for the aggrieved individ-
ual, and effectively pits individuals against their unions in many situ-
ations in which the union is not at fault. Thus, the Vaca "solution"
has been criticized by all concerned."
I argue that the solution resulted from the Court's desire to im-
pose external standards of behavior on union decision-making with-
out undermining the industrial pluralist mandate of exclusive union
85. 386 U.S. 171 (1967), discussed in Stone, supra note 3, at 1536-37.
86. The duty of fair representation is a judicially-created doctrine by which courts
enforce a standard for union behavior in contract negotiations and in the grievance pro-
cedure. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
87. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87.
88. See, e.g., Kroner, The Individual Employee-His 'Rights' in Arbitration After Vaca v.
Sipes, 20r AM. CONF. LAB., N.Y.U. 75, 81-82 (1967) (criticizing Vaca for increasing the
difficulty for individuals in suits against their employers for violating their collective
agreements); Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and
National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 167, 206 (1968) (arguing that Vaca
effectively destroys an individual's opportunity to sue the employer for breach of con-
tract, and that instead, individuals should be able to sue whenever they can show that the
union refused to take their cases to arbitration); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 817 (1973) (criticizing remedy in Vaca as
inconsistent with proper understanding of role of arbitration in collective bargaining,
and arguing that the proper remedy when a union breaches its duty of fair representa-
tion is for the court to direct the union to take the affected employee's case to arbitra-
tion, not to provide the individual with contractual remedy on the collective bargaining
agreement); Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances after Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J.
559, 574 (1968) ("Vaca v. Sipes does not afford adequate protection to the individual
employee."); Note, Labor Law--Federal Preemption-NLRA Does Not Preempt Court Jurisdic-
tion of Suit Against Union For Breach of its Duty of Fair Representation, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 602,
611 (1967) (criticizing Vaca for not giving NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over duty of fair
representation claims). Note, The Employee's Remedy For a Union Breach of the Duty of Fair
Representation: Vaca v. Sipes, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1351 (1967) (courts should not be the sole
forum for hearing cases of alleged union breach of its duty to represent fairly).
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control of the grievance and arbitration process. 89 The externally
imposed standard necessarily is in tension with the Court's hands-
off approach to resolving breach of contract suits. That is, by thus
policing union decision-making under the rubric of the duty of fair
representation, courts necessarily are intervening in the self-func-
tioning mini-democracy of the workplace. This is in conflict with
the courts' commitment to the opposing policies of industrial plu-
ralism, so that the intervention that results is erratic, cumbersome,
and arbitrary.
Professor Finkin acknowledges that the duty of fair representa-
tion "functions as an externally imposed limit on the union's admin-
istration of the grievance-arbitration procedure."9 However, he
denies that the tension between private ordering and public inter-
vention is inevitable or irreconcilable. Instead he responds to my
argument with a proposal of his own. He proposes that the Act be
amended to give individual workers a statutory right to take their
own cases to arbitration-thereby guaranteeing individual workers
access to the grievance and arbitration procedure and supposedly
eliminating the possibility of a union's breaching its duty of fair rep-
resentation in that regard. 9' He states that pursuant to such an ap-
proach, "[u]nions would be relieved of their role in selecting the
cases to be heard," so that this would solve the duty of fair represen-
tation problem while retaining arbitration as "a private, not a public
forum for the adjudication of the grievance, and the Steelworkers Tril-
89. Stone, supra note 3, at 1537-38. Professor Finkin offers four petty "corrections"
to my account of Vaca v. Sipes, all of them debatable. For example, contrary to Finkin's
first "correction," Finkin, supra note 4, at 69, I never stated that a suit against an em-
ployer was anything other than a Section 301 action. I merely said that when there was a
grievance and arbitration machinery in a collective agreement, the Court treated that as
a bar to an action in court unless the union had breached its duty of fair representation.
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Bowen, makes the same point. See 459 U.S. at
236 (WhiteJ., dissenting). Professor Finkin's second "correction" concerns whether or
not a union's breach of its duty of fair representation violates Section 8(b)(1) of the Act,
and is thus an unfair labor practice. Although I may inadvertently suggest that was de-
finitively the case, Stone, supra note 3, at 1536, I refer to that part of the Supreme
Court's Vaca decision in which the Court said, "We may assume for present purposes
that such a breach of duty by the union is an unfair labor practice, as the NLRB and the
Fifth Circuit have held." 386 U.S. at 186. There the Court treated breach of the duty as
an arguable unfair labor practice, and that was all that my argument required.
On the whole, Finkin's "corrections" go to the issue of whether the Vaca decision
really involved a jurisdictional or choice-of-forum issue-which it clearly did-and
whether the court gave adequate reasons for adopting the choice that it did-about
which Professor Finkin and I evidently disagree.
90. Finkin, supra note 4, at 71.
91. Id.
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ogy would be totally unaffected."92
This proposal is interesting, and it might have ramifications
worth exploring. However, whatever its virtues, the suggestion that
it would solve the duty of fair representation problem and leave the
Steelworkers Trilogy "totally unaffected" is simply wrong. Arbitration
is expensive and consumes a lot of union resources. If every em-
ployee had a statutory right to take his or her grievance to arbitra-
tion, then many unions might choose, or be forced to choose, to get
out of the grievance and arbitration business altogether and thus
cease negotiating such provisions in their agreements.9" This would
totally undermine the basis of the Trilogy, which is to encourage the
parties to agree to resolve their disputes through arbitration and to
leave management and the union free to design and operate the
grievance procedures as they wish. 94
Furthermore, under Finkin's proposal, unions that did not
abandon grievance and arbitration procedures altogether would
presumably remain accountable under some standard of fair repre-
sentation for decisions to pursue some cases more vigorously than
others, or to devote more union resources to some rather than
others. Courts would be left with the messy task of deciding
whether in any particular case the union gave the grievant the kind
of support that the duty requires, and whether it made an arbitrary
or otherwise improper decision to bring certain cases to arbitration
on its own, while relegating other cases to the individual's own re-
sources. In addition, judicial scrutiny would be necessary to decide
whether any particular arbitration procedure measured up to the
minimum standards which the statute envisioned, and whether the
union adequately bore its share of the costs. All of these forms of
judicial involvement would again open the door for the courts to
intervene in the process, and substance, of the "privatized" world of
arbitration.95 Thus, Professor Finkin's proposal, while interesting,
92. Id.
93. Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and National
Labor Relations Acts, 34J. AIR L. & COM. 167, 205 (1968) (if employees were permitted to
compel arbitration on anything they wished over the union's objection, and if the union
had to pay the expenses of such arbitrations, it "would quickly bankrupt many unions").
94. The proposal that individuals have guaranteed access to the grievance procedure
has also been criticized on the grounds that the employer would no longer be able to
rely on the procedure as being final and binding and/or may have to arbitrate all cases.
In such situations, the employer may refuse to agree to arbitration provisions, and in-
stead risk strikes. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 19, at 782-83.
95. Courts have already been called upon in fair representation cases to judge the
manner in which a union handles particular cases in arbitration and the degree of arbi-
tral due process provided. See, e.g., Hines v. Motor Anchor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976)
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does not demonstrate that there can be a solution to the duty of fair
representation problem which does not implicate the pluralists'
choice of a private forum for deciding disputes over breaches of col-
lective agreements. In fact, it demonstrates the contrary.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
Two other aspects of my article with which Professor Finkin
takes issue are my discussions of the role of the arbitrator and of the
relationship between industrial pluralism and the human relations
school of industrial sociology. Although he treats these as two sepa-
rate points, they are actually two aspects of the same point and con-
cern the most central question of all-whether industrial pluralism
is harmful or helpful to organized labor. Given the centrality of pri-
vate arbitration to the pluralist vision of collective bargaining, it is
necessary to ask whether arbitral decision-making in disputes about
the enforcement of collective agreements furthers the goal of demo-
cratic participation by labor in the workplace.
In making my argument that it does not, I argue that many arbi-
trators see their task as more than the mere interpretation and ap-
plication of the language of an agreement: They see their mandate
as the alleviation of tensions in a shop.96 I further argue that by
tailoring their interventions in such a way as to preserve order and
alleviate tensions, these arbitrators are preserving a management-
serving order.9 7 I also show how these arbitrators justify these in-
terventions in the language of the human relations approach to per-
sonnel management, an approach which itself aims to alleviate
tensions in order to enhance worker productivity for the benefit of
management.9 s
Professor Finkin treats this as an argument that arbitrators con-
(union breached the duty of fair representation by inadequately investigating the facts
involved in the case); Milstead v. Local 957, IBT, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978)
("the duty of fair representation may be breached wherever a union ineptly handles a
grievance"); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn.) (assessing damages
against union for failure to raise free speech defense at arbitration), modified, 514 F.2d
285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). See also Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its
Glory are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 97, 127 (1977) ("U]udicial intrusion ... may ...
result in the correction of what appears to be injustice. But the price to be paid for that
correction may be too high."). Professor Finkin's proposal would open the floodgates
even wider to judicial scrutiny of union activities behind the green door of arbitration.
96. Stone, supra note 3, 1563-64. I suggest that this definition of the arbitrators' role
makes the arbitrator more like an "industrial relations psychiatrist" than like a judge,
despite the division of powers and mini-democracy rhetoric of industrial pluralism. Id.
97. Id. at 1565.
98. Id. at 1566-68.
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sciously "co-opt" grievants, and he says he finds this astonishing. 99
However, beyond his expressions of dismay, his actual arguments
are difficult to follow. This is because he switches back and forth
between two different lines of attack, lines which are somewhat in-
consistent with each other and which are never clearly sorted out.
On the one hand, he disagrees with my claim that arbitrators see
their role as involving active intervention into plant life. On the
other hand, he disagrees with my assertion that when arbitrators in-
tervene in the name of preserving order, they are de facto acting on
the side of management.
In his attempt to refute my claim that most arbitrators believe
that they should adopt an interventionist posture, Professor Finkin
gives an account of the development of the "standing umpire" sys-
tems in the United Auto Workers contracts with General Motors
and the Ford Motor Company, and recounts a debate among arbi-
trators about how interventionist an arbitrator should be.'0 0 From
this he claims that my characterization of arbitrators is flawed be-
cause I incorrectly generalize from the personal and idiosyncratic
style of Harry Shulman.' ° '
If Finkin's point is that I ignore the complexity of the debates
about the arbitrator's proper role, I believe he is mistaken. In my
discussion of this subject, I say that "Shulman's view reflects an ex-
treme position in the debate about the role of arbitrators that took
place in the 1950s and 1960s." ' °2 I then go on to discuss some of
the most important issues around which the debate crystallized. I
state that while there were various views on the various issues,
"[p]ositions on these issues tended to cluster. In general, the plural-
ists favored Shulman's approach of the creative, free-wheeling,
sometimes-mediator arbitrator."10 3 I then contrast these views with
those of Lon Fuller, who advocated a more judicial and detached
role for the arbitrator, 0 4 and point out the irony that those who
99. Finkin, supra note 4, at 74. See also id. at 71 ("The thrust of Stone's piece is that
pluralist ideology, as embodied in the law and practice of grievance arbitration, contrib-
utes to the co-optation of the working class."). The word "co-optation" is Professor
Finkin's word, not mine, and it is not clear to me exactly what he would have it mean or
what he is accusing me of saying.
100. Id. at 72-73.
101. Id. at 74.
102. Stone, supra note 3, at 1561.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1562-63, citing Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 8 (M. Kahn ed. 1962). Other nonpluralists of
the era adopted the approach of Lon Fuller. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 1562 n.283
(citing cases). See also Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE LJ. 1019, 1034
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most ardently advocated the metaphor of the workplace as a mini-
democracy, with arbitration as the metaphoric judiciary, were the
same who advocated or implemented a less-than-judicial role for the
arbitrator.' 0 5
Finkin disagrees with my statement that the pluralists, on the
whole, favored the Shulman approach over the Fuller approach. As
evidence, Finkin cites an article by Killingsworth and Wallen to the
effect that Shulman's approach was not the prevailing one, even
within the Ford-UAW Umpireship for which Shulman served for
many years.' 0 6 However, according to Killingsworth and Wallen,
what was rejected by other arbitrators was Shulman's predeliction
for mediation at the expense of adjudication altogether. Thus, they
state that for the first ten years of Shulman's tenure as the standing
umpire, "most of the important decisions were the product of medi-
ation rather than adjudication,"' ' and that even after that, Shulman
continued to take a mediative rather than adjudicative approach.'0 8
I never claim that the pluralists called for mediation instead of
arbitration. I claim that the pluralists had an interventionist view of
how arbitrators should handle cases while acting in an adjudicative
capacity. I locate this view in their positions on issues such as
whether arbitrators should inject their own values into the contract
interpretation process or whether arbitrators should actively partici-
pate in hearings.'0 9 Wallen and Killingsworth do not refute this,
and in fact their descriptions of how they handle their own cases
bear this out.'' 0
(1965) (faulting arbitration for departing from the model of judicial administration of
contract violations); Morse, The Judicial Theory of Arbitration, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND
THE PUBLIC 489-90 (W. Bakke & C. Kerr eds. 1948) (arguing that too often arbitrators
depart from judicial procedures by such actions as imposing a compromise on the par-
ties or taking judicial notice of interests and facts not established in the record of the
hearing; when they do so, they wrong the parties and impair the effectiveness of arbitra-
tion as a judicial method of settling labor disputes).
105. Stone, supra note 3, at 1563.
106. Finkin, supra note 4, at 74 (citing Killingsworth & Wallen, Constraint and Variety in
Arbitration Systems, 17 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 67-68 (1964)).
107. Killingsworth & Wallen, supra note 106, at 67.
108. Id. at 67-68.
109. Stone, supra note 3, at 1561-62 & n.283.
110. Wallen himself, at the same meeting at which he delivered the paper Finkin cites,
spoke on a panel with several other noted arbitrators about the conduct of arbitration
hearings. There he and others gave detailed descriptions of their own manner of con-
ducting arbitration hearings, in which it is clear that he and the co-panelists depart from
a judicial model in many respects. For example, Wallen said he believed in intervening
in the arbitration hearing, at least when one of the parties has presented its case incom-
petently. As he said, "I am of the school that wants to find out what the case is about,
even if I am courting the risk of appearing to make out a case for one of the parties."
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Finkin's argument does, however, point out an interesting fact
about the history of arbitration. That is, throughout the history of
arbitration there was a recurring debate between those who believed
arbitration should replicate formal judicial procedures and those
who believed that the very essence of arbitration is its informality.
This debate lies at the heart of many of the controversies within the
arbitration community for the past thirty-five years.IIt In the early
days, the controversy was between those who saw arbitrators as
mediators or counselors and those who saw them as adjudicators of
disputes. George Taylor and Harry Schulman represented the for-
mer position and the American Arbitration Association represented
the latter. In this dispute, as Finkin says, the Taylor-Shulman model
of arbitrator as mediator/father confessor lost out to the view of
arbitrator as adjudicator.' 1 2 But this is not the end of the story.
Among those who believed in the adjudicative role of the arbi-
trator, there was a further controversy as to how far the judicial
analogy went. 1 3 Some believed that it should be taken literally, and
thus advocated that hearings be conducted like trials, with formal
rules of procedure and evidence, and that decision-making be based
solely upon the language of the agreement and duly admitted evi-
dence of bargaining history and contractual intent." 4 Others be-
lieved that procedures should be more lax, that all kinds of
proferred testimony and evidence should be admitted, and that arbi-
trators should decide cases based on considerations other than the
Wallen, Procedural Problems in the Conduct of Arbitration Hearings: A Discussion, in LABOR AR-
BITRATION: PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS, PROC. 17TH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB.
1, 12 (1964).
At another point, in discussing the scope of cross-examination, Wallen suggested
that he is disinclined to impose limits because "[e]ventually everybody says what he
wants to say and is supposed to say." Id. at 9. He also made it clear that he only applied
his somewhat lax procedures in "a typical arbitration," not in those which are "in its
essential character, a trial." Id. See also B. LANDIS, VALUE JUDGMENTS IN ARBITRATION: A
CASE STUDY OF SAUL WALLEN (1977) 164-65.
111. See generally Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 109, 114 (1985) (describing the various debates that have raged during the his-
tory of the National Academy of Arbitrators).
112. Braden, The Function of the Arbitrator in Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.)
35 (1949) (the American Arbitration Association and some sixty individual arbitrators
rejected the mediation approach of Taylor in favor of the view that the arbitrator was a
judicial officer).
113. See generally Gitelman, The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, 9 DE PAUL L. REV. 181,
189 (1959) (describing divergence of opinion between arbitrators who believe in a .'la-
bor relations' approach," whereby awards "must be palatable" to the parties, and arbi-
trators who believe that arbitration is quasi-judicial and that disputes should be resolved
"in terms of the bargaining agreement").
114. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 104; Morse, supra notel04; Hays, supra note 104.
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language of the contract."1 5 This latter conception of the arbitra-
tor's role was the one that became dominant in the post-war
period. 116
Thus, while there was controversy about the mediative style of
Schulman, most arbitrators nonetheless adopted an interventionist
style of arbitration. They did this because they believed that the
arbitral process was different from the judicial process in important
ways, and that, at least to some extent, it called for decision-making
on the basis of other factors. For example, many arbitrators spoke
about the importance of "acceptability" of their decisions as a major
factor in labor arbitration." 7 Other arbitrators stressed the impor-
tance of rendering decisions that promoted efficiency or preserved
smooth operations." 8 The interjection of these extraneous factors
into the decision-making process is justified in a variety of ways," 9
115. See, e.g., Wallen's comments in Procedural Problems, supra note 110.
116. See supra note 110; Stone, supra note 3, at 1565 n.300.
117. See, e.g., Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REV.
1245, 1245-46 (1963) ("A greater premium is placed on the acceptability of an arbitra-
tor's award by the parties in a dispute than would normally be the case with a court
decision.") Cf Hays, supra note 104, at 1035 (the fact that arbitrators are dependent
upon the parties themselves for their livelihood, and thus must render "acceptable
awards" means that their decision-making process may be distorted).
118. See, e.g., B. LANDIS, supra note 110, at 164 (Wallen frequently injected "considera-
-tions of productive efficiency, industrial relations stability, and equity" into his arbitra-
tion decisions, even where there was evidence that the parties intended otherwise. "In a
very few exceptional instances, he was even willing to ignore the agreement's clear writ-
ten terms where the result of those terms was repugnant to his personal values.");
Gross, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 55,
70 (1967-68) ("Examination of arbitral opinion on management rights, subcontracting,
and out-of-unit transfers of work has borne witness to the existence of a dominant value
theme-efficiency, as the summum bonum.").
The Labor and Employment Law Committee of the American Bar Association re-
ported in 1981 that arbitrators often "split the baby" rather than give either side a clear
remedy because they often feel that this is "politically expedient and also proper." Re-
port of the Committee on Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1981
A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw REP., vol. 2, at 196.
119. Recently, ProfessorJohn Dunsford, former President of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, has argued that arbitrators should not adopt a judicial model of arbitration
because such a model would "petrify" the arbitration process. See Dunsford, supra note
111, at 126. However, Dunsford does not specify exactly what that means, i.e., what
arbitrators can do that judges or administrative law judges cannot, other than to say that
by dispensing with the "judge-in-court model... the decision-maker may.. .penetrate,
unimpeded by the burden ofjudge-made rules, to the elements that are of importance
to the industrial relations process." Id. at 128. Athough this formulation sounds com-
pelling, it does not adequately justify a model of arbitration that differs from a judicial
one. We are not told what is so unique or exotic about the "industrial relations process"
that demands special skills or procedures and that eludes judicial, or administrative,
capability. Dunsford attempts to make his argument about the specialness of the "in-
dustrial relations process" by listing a series of differences between arbitration and judi-
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but few arbitrators would deny that it occurs. 12 0
If it is in fact true that arbitrators inject their own values into
their decisions, and if those values generally include considerations
of stability, efficiency, and the continuity of operations, then the
question of which side benefits from such considerations assumes
paramount importance. 12 ' This is an important question: It is
about the legitimacy of arbitration as a substitute for litigation. 22 It
is also a question about the desirability of industrial pluralism. Un-
fortunately, while Professor Finkin objects to my argument on this
point, he does not ever join issue on this question.
I argue that when arbitrators intervene to preserve stability and
order, they are acting de facto on the side of management.12 This is
because of the dual nature of the concept of "order" in an environ-
cial adjudication which he claims justify a different approach. He notes that the
arbitration forum is private, that arbitrators are not bound by precedent or by the rules
of procedure or evidence, and that arbitrators have no enforcement powers. Id. at 126-
27. However, these differences between arbitration and litigation cannot justify a non-
judicial methodology for arbitration because they are the very differences that Dunsford
is attempting to explain. That is, Dunsford's argument is circular.
120. Even Finkin acknowledges that "arbitrators must be guided by sources outside
the collective agreement." Indeed, he calls this a "truism." Finkin, supra note 4, at 74.
As authority for this, he cites Justice Douglas' statement in the Trilogy that considera-
tions of morale, productivity, and whether "tensions will be heightened or diminished"
are properly part of the arbitrator's judgment. This supports my point.
121. These considerations may sound neutral and innocuous to outsiders, but to par-
ticipants they can sometimes mean that hard-fought and important contractual rights are
disregarded. A recent and wide-spread example is the effort in the late 1970s and early
1980s for companies to institute what they call "no fault" absenteeism programs. Under
these programs, workers are subject to progressive discipline, up to and including termi-
nation, on the basis of absences of any kind, whether for good reasons or for bad. Un-
ions contended that these programs violated various provisions of their contracts,
including existing sickness benefit provisions, absence provisions, and just cause for dis-
charge provisions. Almost universally, arbitrators upheld such "no-fault absence" pro-
grams on the grounds that they were a reasonable response to high rates of absenteeism
which caused severe economic impact on the companies concerned. See, e.g., Union Tank
Car Co. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1981)
(upholding no-fault absence program against union's challenge that it violated sick ben-
efit and discipline provisions in the collective agreement); Lima Register Co. and United
Independent Workers, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 935 (1981) (upholding no-fault absence pro-
gram against union's challenge that it violated absence and discipline provisions in col-
lective agreement). See generally Report of the Committee on Labor Arbitration and the Law of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW REP., vol. 2,
at 60. ("In the private sector, the most frequently arbitrated issues [of the past year]
dealt with absenteeism and discipline over absentee control procedures, especially of
the 'no fault' type whereby absences, irrespective of their reasons, are all counted and
progressive discipline is imposed after certain levels of absenteeism are reached.").
122. See genrally Fuller, supra note 104, at 26-27 (intervention by arbitrator's to "rig"
awards, even if for good motives, undermines legitimacy of arbitration process).
123. Stone, supra note 3, at 1565.
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ment of unequal power. In such a situation, "order" means simulta-
neously the absence of chaos and the preservation of the unequal
status quo. In the labor-management relationship, there is an asym-
metry in the two sides' ability to take unilateral action. Management
is the party that initiates unilateral action in a workplace; the union's
only options are to acquiesce or grieve.1 24 Stated differently, man-
agement creates the status quo and the union is always in the posi-
tion of seeking to change it. Thus, "normalcy" is, by definition, a
management-created normalcy. Therefore, when an arbitrator
seeks to preserve normalcy, it is a management-serving form of
"order."1 25
I am not the first to note this lack of symmetry between the
power of management and labor to change the status quo. Jack
Barbash, a respected industrial relations scholar, explains it this
way:
There is no direct management analogue to the strike,
although the lockout is so perceived. Actually, the em-
ployer need not resort to the lockout to have his way.
Since the worker cannot change the terms of employment
unilaterally and the employer's consent is always required
to make any change operative, all the employer needs to do
is to say no in order to oppose union demands. Therefore,
the initiative to withhold always has to come from the
union and/or a group of workers.' 2 6
124. See, e.g., Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process, in LABOR ARBITRATION: PERSPEC-
TIVES AND PROBLEMS, PROC. 17TH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB., 33, 51 (1964) ("With
relatively minor exceptions the accepted pattern of conduct under a collective bargain-
ing contract in the United States is for the company to retain the initiative, subject to
complaints on the part of the union that the contract has been violated."). Accord Stone,
supra note 3, at 1551 n.229 ("There is a commonly accepted doctrine among arbitrators
that a worker who is aggrieved by a company order that he believes violates the agree-
ment must obey first and then file a grievance."); id. at 1565 n.300 (citing cases on the
origin and application of the "obey now-grieve later" rule).
125. Solicitor General Charles Fried disagrees with my argument that the preserva-
tion of order in the industrial setting tends to favor management over labor. See Fried,
Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and its Prospects, 51 U. CHL. L. REV. 1012, 1014-15 (1984). He asserts that unions, by
consenting to the collective bargaining agreement, have consented to the substitution of
arbitration for strikes, thus suggesting that they must see arbitration as an adequate
substitute means of exercising their power. This statement demonstrates my claim that
industrial pluralism has constricted the universe of options both in fact and in the imagi-
nation. I never argue that strikes are always, or even usually, preferable to arbitration
for settling disputes. My argument is about the superiority of judicial or administrative
fora for resolving disputes-fora which would, at least presumably, resolve them on the
merits and not on the basis of preserving a management-serving form of "order."
126. J. BARBASH, THE ELEMENTS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 62 (1984).
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Thus, when arbitrators decide cases on the basis of preserving order
without questioning who benefits from the status quo, they are un-
wittingly acting in favor of management.
As part of this argument, I show that one of the ways in which
arbitrators justify their interventionist role comes from the human
relations school's approach to personnel management. 27 The
human relations school of industrial psychology had as its stated
aim to improve productivity by inducing workers to view their
problems as individual, rather than collective, in nature. 28 I show
the similarity between the ideas embodied in human relations writ-
ings and certain key passages in the writings of some of industrial
pluralism's leading advocates-most notably Professor Archibald
Cox and Justice Douglas. 129
Professor Finkin wholeheartedly rejects my argument that the
industrial pluralist interpretation of the arbitrator's role draws on
the human relations school of industrial psychology."' 0 While he
agrees that human relations sociology was designed to manipulate
workers and co-opt their discontent, 3' he says I have not proved
that the industrial pluralists shared anything with the
"Hawthornizers."' 1 2 He cites Ivar Berg for the proposition that the
two groups were in fundamental and irreconcilable opposition. 1 33
Professor Finkin's rejection of my argument is a little too smug.
While it is true that some practitioners of human relations sociology
saw an irreconcilable conflict between the ideas of human relations
and the concept of collective bargaining, others sought to reconcile
them. For example, Professor Benjamin Selekman of the Harvard
Business School wrote a highly regarded book in 1947, in which he
sought to convince the business community to accept unionism pre-
cisely because it was compatible with human relations theories of
personnel management. 134 Similarly, Ivar Berg in a work with Eli
127. Stone, supra note 3, at 1571-72.
128. Id. at 1572-73.
129. Id. at 1571-72.
130. Finkin, supra note 4, at 79.
131. Id. at 77-78.
132. The human relations school of industrial sociology had its origin in experiments
on the effects of lighting on worker productivity at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works.
Stone, supra note 3, at 1567.
133. Finkin, supra note 4, at 79.
134. B. SELEKMAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RELATIONS v-ix (1947). See discus-
sion in Stone, supra note 3, at 1569. See also M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUS-
TRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, 476 (1970), in which he says that "[a]lthough Mayo [the
founder of the human relations school] himself virtually ignored unionism, some of his
colleagues, like Ben Selekman, and followers, like William Whyte, made persuasive cases
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Ginzberg wrote about the compatibility of human relations and un-
ions in 1963. Like many of the progressive industrial relations writ-
ers in that period, Berg and Ginzberg sought to reconcile human
relations with collective bargaining by expounding an industrial plu-
ralist justification for collective bargaining, while at the same time
advocating a flexibility of approach for arbitrators in which the goal
of their intervention was to alleviate tensions in the plant. Thus,
they state, with echoes of human relations writings:
[A]rbitration is a more flexible method [than judicial proce-
dures] of adjudicating conflicting claims. Since the objec-
tive of arbitration is to keep the disagreements between
management and labor at a minimum, and, when disagree-
ments do arise, to handle them in a manner that contrib-
utes to the major goal of both parties (which is to keep on
working and producing), arbitrators are always future ori-
ented. They must understand the logic of industrial enter-
prise and they must attempt at all times to render decisions
that are in harmony, not in conflict with this logic.'" 5
Others made similar arguments. 3 6 These writings indicate not
only a departure from ajudicial model of arbitration, but a rationale
for doing so which emphasizes the arbitrator's ability to identify and
alleviate tensions in the workplace. This emphasis is characteristic
of the human relations approach. 137
for the application of human relations ideas and techniques to grievance handling and
contract administration."
135. E. GINZBERG & I. BERG, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE RIGHTS OF MANAGEMENT,
198 (1963). Later in the same book, Ginzberg and Berg juxtapose their idea of an in-
terventionist arbitration with the industrial pluralist paradigm:
[The arbitrator's] decision must not only be conducive to management's search
for efficiency but must be acceptable to the workers in their search for equity.
Thus, the arbitrator becomes unwittingly the instrument for expanding the
reach of democracy at the workplace. He helps to extend and deepen the area
within which democratic values find expression. In this process, he makes a
significant contribution to the strengthening of industry and to the expansion
of democracy.
Id. at 205.
136. See, e.g., Carlston, Arbitration: An Institutional Procedure, 4 ARB.J. (n.s.) 248 (1949),
in which he says:
The decision in a labor arbitration case must seek a just solution, and adjust-
ment, of the tensions between groups, i.e., management and labor, whose great-
est interest lies in cooperation within the institution of which they are a part
.... The task of the arbitrator is to ascertain 'the inside story' of the dispute
with which he is confronted.
(Emphasis in original).
137. See alsoJustice Douglas' reference, in the Steelworkers Trilogy, to "whether tensions
will be heightened or diminished," 363 U.S. at 582, discussed supra note 120.
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Professor Finkin claims that I have not "proved" my point.3 8
What, however, would constitute "proof?" I describe the ways in
which many of the advocates of industrial pluralism depart from the
judicial model of arbitration, discuss how they interject factors such
as efficiency and stability into the decision-making process, and then
show that they justify this departure from a judicial method in the
language of the human relations approach.'19 Although more ex-
amples could have been given, I doubt if even hundreds of examples
could have "proved" my argument with the scientific certainty that
Professor Finkin seems to expect. Mine is an argument about the
similarities and cross-influences of two different schools of thought
that emerged in two different fields at approximately the same time.
The only "proof" possible for an argument of this type is whether
the examples given are convincing and/or illuminating of some as-
pect of either school which is otherwise mysterious.
Finkin concludes, as if in summation, by saying, "If Klare is in-
different to the real world, Stone is downright hostile to it. '"140 He
then says that I not only engage in debasement of language, but
present a world that bears an "inverse relation to reality, [which]...
ends in Newspeak."' 41 The alleged Newspeak is my assertion, in
conclusion to my discussion of the relationship between the human
relations approach and the industrial pluralist view of the grievance
procedure, that the industrial pluralist conception of " 'collective
bargaining undermines collective action.' "142 This assertion is in-
deed striking: It is intended as a pithy summation of the antinomy
between the support for collective action that the Act embodies and
the individualizing effect that the human relations approach to
grievances seeks to achieve. By so starkly juxtaposing the concepts
of collective bargaining and collective action, I had hoped to call
attention to the basic idea, embodied in the preamble of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, but too frequently lost in its interpreta-
tive tradition, that one of the Act's main purposes is to promote,
provide, and protect the possibility for collective action by workers
in the belief that by doing so, we could re-envision the possibilities
for attaining true equality between management and labor, and true
democracy in the workplace.
138. Finkin, supra note 4, at 78-79.
139. Stone, supra note 3, at 1566-73.
140. Finkin, supra note 4, at 85.
141. Id. at 86.
142. Id. (quoting Stone, supra note 3, at 1577).
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